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The divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe coincided
with a substantial acceleration in capital-embodied technical change in the late 70’s.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that European economies have been lagging behind
the U.S. in the adoption and usage of new technologies. This paper argues that the
pace of technology adoption plays a fundamental role for how an economy’s labor
market reacts to an acceleration in capital-embodied growth. The framework pro-
posed oﬀers an appealing and novel explanation for the divergence of unemployment
rates across economies that are hit by the very same shock (i.e. the acceleration in
embodied technical change) but diﬀer in their technology adoption behavior. More-
over, we challenge the conventional wisdom that high European unemployment is
the result of institutional rigidities by claiming that institutions are not the princi-
pal cause per se but they rather amplify certain forces that promote the emergence
of high unemployment.
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After low levels of unemployment until the late 1970s, European unemployment rates
became high relative to that in the United States. Labor markets in Europe started to
deteriorate at a time when there was a substantial acceleration in the arrival of new tech-
nologies as measured by capital-embodied technical change. As documented in Gordon’s
(1990) inﬂuential work on the quality-adjusted price of capital, and more recently by
Cummins and Violante (2002), the rate of change in the relative price of new capital in-
vestments in the U.S. has decreased substantially from −2% before the mid-70s to −4.5%
in the 1990s, suggesting an acceleration in embodied technical change1. There is convinc-
ing empirical evidence, some of which is provided by Oliner and Sichel (2000), Jorgenson
and Stiroh (2000) and van Ark et al. (2002), indicating that - with a few exceptions
- European economies have been lagging behind the U.S. in the adoption and usage of
new technologies. This is reﬂected by a persistent growth and technology gap relative
to the U.S. - as measured by per capita GDP growth, labor productivity growth in the
manufacturing sector, the share of information and communication technologies (ICT) in
investment and its contribution to output growth. The coexistence of a technology deﬁcit
- resulting from slack technology adoption - and the divergence of unemployment rates
across economies are not coincidental. The main hypotheses of this paper is that the
pace of technology adoption plays a fundamental role for how an economy’s labor market
reacts to an acceleration in capital-embodied growth. We challenge the conventional view
that high rates of European unemployment are the result of labor market institutions by
claiming that institutions are not the principal cause of high unemployment per se but
they rather show the tendency to amplify certain forces that promote the emergence of
high levels of unemployment2. These forces are generated through the interaction of (a)
the rate of arrival of new technologies, (b) the speed of their adoption and (c) the speed
with which workers accumulate technology-speciﬁc skills and (d) the degree of turbulence,
i.e. the order of magnitude of worker’s skill depreciation during spells of unemployment.
1A number of authors, starting from Greenwood et al. (1997) have suggested to measure the speed of
embodied technical change through the rate of decline of the relative (quality-adjusted) price of capital.
2Researchers and policy-makers very often stress the importance of various labor market institutions
for explaining high rates of unemployment in major European countries. Their line of argument is that
institutions create rigidities in the labor market and prevent a ﬂuid reallocation of labor. This argument
is highly controversial. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), for instance, notice that the institutions which
generate these rigidities were also present in the 1960s and in the 1960s unemployment was much higher
in the U.S. than in Europe. Taking the same line, Oswald (1997) claims that ”Despite conventional
wisdom, high unemployment does not appear to be primarily the result of things like overly generous
beneﬁts, trade union power, taxes or wage ”inﬂexibility”.”, (Oswald, 1997, p.1) By contrast, in a recent
empirical analysis of unemployment patterns in OECD countries Nickell et al. (2005) ﬁnd that changes
in labor market institutions explain around 55% of the rise in European unemployment from the 1960s
to the ﬁrst half of the 1990s.
1The framework provided in the paper oﬀers an appealing and novel explanation for the
divergence of unemployment rates across economies that are hit by the very same shock
(i.e. the acceleration in embodied technical change) but diﬀer with respect to their ex-ante
technology updating behavior. The main forces at work are the following. When ﬁrms
in an economy update their production technology rather sluggishly, workers operate a
certain technology for a relatively long time, hence they accumulate substantial amounts
of skills on that technology. The eﬀect of these skills on wages we will refer to a as ”skill
eﬀect”. If these skills are technology speciﬁc than a displaced worker looses parts, or all, of
his skills upon lay-oﬀ. This loss of human capital implies that new wage oﬀers - that reﬂect
a worker’s current level of skills - are potentially lower than the pre-displacement wage3.
In an environment where institutions provide generous unemployment beneﬁts (that are
proportional to the worker’s previous wage income), displaced workers, therefore, possess
a valuable outside option in the wage negotiation which reduces ﬁrms incentives to create
new jobs. If there is high technology turnover in an economy - in the sense that ﬁrms
renovate their production technology rather often - then the amount of accumulated expe-
rience on a speciﬁc technology is relatively low. However, frequent updating also implies
that workers operate technologies which are, on average, closer to the technology frontier,
which has a positive eﬀect on wages. This eﬀect will be referred to as the ”vintage eﬀect”.
Which of these two eﬀects - the skill and the vintage eﬀect - dominates will determine
the impact of learning on wages and consequently on job creation and unemployment.
There is a second, potentially important, channel through which the frequency of tech-
nology updates inﬂuences an economy’s labor market performance. Operating a particular
production technology requires a certain set of skills and knowledge, e.g. workers need
to possess the knowledge of how to operate the machines they are working with. This
production knowledge can be considered as partly vintage-speciﬁc (rather than general)
which implies its limited transferability across technologies. As a consequence, a worker
that gets to operate a technology diﬀerent from her previous can transfer only a frac-
tion of her original production knowledge into the new occupation. Technologies that are
”close” to (”far away” from) each other in terms of technological advancement are likely
to require a similar (very diﬀerent) set of skills. Hence the fraction of skills that can be
transfered will depend on the relative ”distance” between technologies. As the leading
edge technology, constantly advances there is a gap emerging between the technologies
that were implemented by ﬁrms already at an earlier date and the technology frontier.
3There is considerable empirical evidence, some of which is provided by Farber (1993) and Jacobson
et al. (1993) saying that the earnings loss suﬀered by displaced workers is positively related to tenure
on the pre-displacement job which is consistent with the destruction of job-speciﬁc human capital when
a long-term job ends. This gives support for the model’s characteristic that for high tenure workers -
i.e. the ones that have accumulated a lot of job-speciﬁc skills - the diﬀerence between the pre- and the
post-displacement wage is rather high.
2Infrequent updating implies that workers operate technologies for a relatively long time
and hence this technology gap will be rather wide. As those workers get attached to more
advanced technologies - either through a technology update within a ﬁrm or the transition
to a new ﬁrm - the fraction of their production knowledge that can be transfered will,
on average, be small. Hence, there is a discrepancy arising between a worker’s current
production knowledge and the knowledge that is required to operate the new technol-
ogy. This discrepancy can be considered as a form of skill obsolescence implied by the
limited transferability of workers production knowledge. I.e. a worker’s human capital
becomes obsolete relative to that required at the frontier given that the amount that can
be transfered decreases over time. To make a worker’s production knowledge compatible
with the state-of-the-art, ﬁrms potentially need to invest a substantial amount in costly
training. Provided that these expenses do not add anything to workers productivity but
are rather sunk they reduce the net present value of a job. These costs are increasing in
the size of the gap, therefore slow technology adoption - which implies a high degree of
workers human capital obsolescence - reduces ﬁrm incentives to open up new vacancies
since high training costs reduce the net surplus of creating new jobs. Before we proceed
with providing some stylized facts let us brieﬂy summarize the main mechanism that are
shaping an economy’s rate of unemployment.
• Slack technology adoption implies the accumulation of large amounts of technology-
speciﬁc skills. This potentially triggers a skill eﬀect that drives a wedge between
pre- and post-displacement earnings. Hence, for suﬃciently generous unemploy-
ment beneﬁts the value of being unemployed, i.e. a workers outside option, is large
relative to the value of a new job which strengthens workers’ bargaining power
and discourages ﬁrms to create new jobs. A vintage eﬀect that implies a negative
tenure/relative wage proﬁle might counteract.
• Sluggish updating implies that workers, on average, operate technologies that are
far away from the frontier. Hence their production knowledge is relatively obsolete.
This necessitates costly training in the case of a technology update or a re-match
which reduces the net present value of a job for a ﬁrm and therefore reduces job
creation.
• Rapid technical change implies that the technology gap for displaced individuals
(i.e. the gap between the production knowledge used in their previous occupation
and that required at the frontier) widens rather quickly. Hence training costs for
newly hired workers are expected to be higher on average. This eﬀect is more severe
in economies that have slow technology adoption and therefore exhibit a relatively
large fraction of long-tenured workers.
3Related literature
In the recent years economists have oﬀered numerous explanations for the emergence of
high European unemployment in the late 1970s, involving factors such as overly generous
welfare systems, slow TFP growth or capital market imperfections to mention just a few4.
One particularly inﬂuential strand of this literature emphasizes the interaction of shocks
and labor market institutions as the main driving force for high levels of European un-
employment. Key references include Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007), Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999) and Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007). The framework proposed
by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) is the ﬁrst rigorous attempt to study the shock-policy
interaction within a calibrated model. A related explanation is oﬀered by Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999). The line of argument proposed by these authors is as follows. European
unemployment went up because of reduced workers’ incentives to exit unemployment.
Workers in Europe prefer to collect generous unemployment beneﬁts rather than to work
for a low wage given that the technology shock made their skills obsolete - as in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998) - or made it increasingly diﬃcult to match with existing vacancies -
as in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). The mechanism in those papers operates primarily
through the labor supply side. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) is a reﬁnement that consid-
ers a matching framework in which ﬁrms adjust labor demand as part of the adjustment
process. The shock considered in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007) refers to a general
change in the economic environment, i.e. an increased degree of economic turbulence,
rather than an explicit shock to technological change. Recently a number of economists
pointed at the potential importance of embodied technical change for explaining the diﬀer-
ences in labor market outcomes across countries. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007)
were the ﬁrst that highlighted the interaction between capital-embodied technical change
and labor market institutions. In their model an increase in embodied technical change
leads to a sharp reduction in ﬁrms labor demand in the welfare state economy whereas is
has only mild eﬀects on labor demand in the laissez-faire economy and consequently un-
employment rises by much less. These models, however, suﬀer from a serious shortcoming.
They are designed to reproduce the movements of an average European unemployment
rate ignoring the large heterogeneity of unemployment rates across European countries.
Recently Blanchard (2005) pointed out that talking about ”European unemployment”
is misleading since high average European unemployment reﬂects high unemployment in
four large continental countries, Germany, Italy, Spain and France, whereas unemploy-
ment is low (and even below the U.S. level) in many other European countries. Arguably,
a theory that addresses the issue of European unemployment but fails to explain (or ex-
4See Nickell (2003) for a recent survey of research on the issue of European unemployment. Blanchard
(2005) is an excellent assessment of what we know already and what remains to be explained regarding
the European unemployment question.
4ante ignores) the large heterogeneity across European labor markets clearly conﬂicts with
an essential aspect of actuality and is likely to disregard relevant factors related to the
issue. The determinants of the observed heterogeneity are unlikely to be of an institu-
tional nature. Even though welfare states across Europe diﬀer in some respects the main
properties are predominant in almost all states. Explicitly accounting for (small) diﬀer-
ences in institutional settings is not likely to resolve the problem. This paper proposes a
framework in which cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁrms technology adoption behavior can
account for a large part of the divergence of unemployment rates across economies that are
hit by the very same shock (i.e. the acceleration in capital-embodied technical change).
These diﬀerences in the adoption behavior are highly consistent with existing empirical
evidence and are likely to be result of diﬀerences in regulatory environments. The model
builds upon the matching framework in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) that includes an
endogenous technology choice by ﬁrms. However the model of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998) such as that of Hornstein et al. (2007) displays one stark and clearly unrealistic
feature: workers are not constraint by any skill requirements when switching between
technologies that diﬀer in the level of technological advancement. Hence, individuals can
transit from less to more advanced technologies without any extra cost. This implies that
it is equally costly for ﬁrms to hire a worker coming from a high-tech or a low-tech job5.
One might conjecture that technologies are likely to diﬀer with respect to the set of skills
and abilities required to operate them. Newer and more advanced technologies require
diﬀerent skills than older and less advanced ones. Evidently, in a framework that considers
capital-embodied technical change the issue of workers skill obsolescence is of particular
relevance since the set of skills needed (e.g. for the most advanced technology) is subject
to changes over time. The framework presented in this paper explicitly models workers’
skill dynamics. It can therefore account for increased human capital obsolescence caused
by a technology shock which will be an important determinant of how ﬁrms adjust their
labor demand in the aftermath of a shock. Also Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007)
consider a form of human capital obsolescence but the mechanism proposed in this paper
is signiﬁcantly richer. Unlike Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007), that are not explicit
about the underlying economic mechanism, the degree of skill obsolescence in this paper
is partly endogenous and as it is driven by ﬁrms technology choice. In this way we are able
to add microfoundation to the turbulence approach (pioneered by Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998)) and to provide a rationale for increased turbulence (i.e. skill obsolescence) that
was caused by an acceleration in embodied technical change in the mid 1970s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section aims at motivating
5The only cost that is involved in the labor reallocation process is due to search. The explicit acqui-
sition of skills (if there is any) is generally uncoupled from a worker’s previous experience.
5the analysis by presenting a variety of stylized facts. In Section 3, I lay out the theoretical
model and discuss the characteristics of the labor market. Sections 4 and 5 brieﬂy discuss
the calibration of the model and the algorithm that was used to solve the model. Section
6 presents and discusses the results and Section 7 performs a variety of sensitivity checks
and Section 8 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
Unemployment
In the postwar period until the late 1970s unemployment in Europe was low relative to
that in the U.S. The data summarized in Table 1 shows that during the whole period until
the 1980s unemployment in the U.S. was signiﬁcantly higher than that in Europe. In the
1960s and early 70s the average unemployment rate in European was around 2.5% whereas
the U.S. ﬁgure was around 5%. However, the picture had changed dramatically after the
mid-1970s. Unemployment in Europe experienced a sharp and persistent increase up to
a level of around 9%. On the other hand, U.S. unemployment ﬁrst gradually increased in
the late 70s and in the 80s but then declined over time and settled at a rate of around 5%.
The use of the average rate of unemployment is, however, misleading. A closer look reveals
1960 - 69 1970-74 1975-79 1980 - 89 1990 - 99 2000 - 06
U.S. 4,78 5,38 7,04 7,27 5,71 5,11
Euro Area 2,16 2,62 4,76 8,36 9,55 8,43
Austria 2,13 1,30 1,56 2,70 3,87 4,36
Belgium 1,93 2,04 5,96 9,54 8,47 7,74
Denmark 1,11 1,16 5,22 6,67 6,93 4,71
Finland 2,20 2,40 5,16 4,79 11,87 8,84
France 1,75 2,68 4,84 8,54 10,60 9,19
Germany 0,65 0,90 3,12 5,83 6,29 8,46
Greece 5,11 2,70 1,92 6,06 9,03 10,16
Italy 4,86 5,42 6,46 8,39 10,25 8,39
Netherlands 0,84 1,98 5,62 8,16 5,41 3,53
Norway 0,00 1,60 1,90 2,81 4,80 3,99
Spain 2,39 2,92 6,12 15,44 15,89 10,29
Sweden 1,70 2,24 1,86 2,59 7,21 5,96
UK 1,61 2,44 4,54 9,45 8,00 5,01
Source: European Commission, Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO)
Table 1: Average annual unemployment, in %, by subperiod
that there is a wide variation of unemployment rates across European countries. Over
the period 2000 − 06, for instance, ﬁve out of the nine European labor markets in Table
1 produced unemployment rates that are just slightly above or even below the U.S. rate.
6This implies that when we exclude some of the major European countries, in particular
Germany, France and Italy, the famous European unemployment puzzle vanishes6. High
unemployment is therefore not a phenomenon that is speciﬁc to Europe per se but rather to
certain countries. A distinguishing feature of the U.S. labor market is its ﬂuid nature. The
average duration of unemployment is low relative to European countries which evidences a
rapid reallocation of labor across sectors7. Table 2 shows that in the period 2000−04 the
fraction of unemployed being jobless for less than one month is 37.22% in the U.S. while it
is around 5% in Germany, France, Spain and Italy. In contrast only 9% of the unemployed
in U.S. stay out of work for more than one year whereas the number for Germany, France,
Spain and Italy ranges between 40% and 58%. Evidently, high unemployment rates in
some European countries are the results of a massive share of long-term unemployed.
Belgium Germany Denmark Spain France UK Italy Sweden U.S.
< 1 month 7.4 5.76 22.18 5.34 4.48 16.2 5.1 21.34 37.22
[1, 3) months 11.18 11.7 18.96 16.78 18.46 23.98 8.92 22.56 30.8
[6, 12) months 17.12 16.64 18.28 18.84 19.48 15.68 15.66 16.16 8.06
≥ 12 months 50.7 50.32 20.88 41.86 39.7 24.66 58.36 21.28 9.02
Source: OECD, Numbers indicate the fraction of unemployed by duration
Table 2: Average duration of unemployment
Increased Arrival Rate of New Technologies
There is evidence, some of which is provided by Cummins and Violante (2002), Green-
wood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Pakko (2002) that the rate of arrival of new technologies
has increased by the late 1970s. Cummins and Violante (2002) construct an aggregate
index of investment-speciﬁc technological change and ﬁnd that average annual growth
rates were stable around 4% in the postwar period until the late 1970s but then there was
a sharp acceleration in the 1980s that leaded to annual growth rates of more than 6% in
the 1990s. As argued by Hornstein and Krusell (1996) and Yorukoglu (1998) an increase
in the arrival rate of new technologies has important consequences for the process of
technology adoption. A higher rate of technological change means that new technologies
which diﬀer substantially in their characteristics from existing ones are introduced at a
faster rate. This raises the issue of compatibility problems between consecutive vintages.
The improved technology embodied in new capital changes the technological standards
and hence decreases the compatibility between old and new vintages. Yorukoglu (1998)
argues that the more advanced the new technology is relative to the existing one the lower
is the initial experience with the new production technology. This implies that as the rate
6The so-called ”European Unemployment Puzzle” refers to high and persistent rates of unemployment
in Europe relative to that in the United States.
7Farber (1999) ﬁnds that in the U.S. half of all new jobs end in the ﬁrst year and at any point in time
about 20% of workers have been with their current employer for less than one year.
7of technological change increases the less familiar agents will be with the new technology
and hence it will be more costly to adopt it. In times of rapid technological change we
should therefore see an increase in the technology gap and a rise in total adoption costs.
Regarding the former, Cummins and Violante (2002) ﬁnd that the technology gap in the
U.S. (which they deﬁne as the gap between the productivity of the best technology and
the productivity of the average practice in the economy) was 15% in 1975. In 2000 the
ﬁgure had jumped to 40% suggesting a substantial decrease in the frequency of technol-
ogy updates. These ﬁndings are consistent with results provided by Bessen (2002) who
estimates technology adoption costs in the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1961-96. He
ﬁnds that adjustment costs rose sharply during 1974-83 and more than doubled from the
early 1960’s to the late 1980’s. Adoption costs as a percentage of aggregate output had
increased from 2.4% in 1973 to 6.5% in 1983. Bessen (2002) argues that the rise in costs
is speciﬁcially associated with a switch in ﬁrm’s investment towards new technologies.
Technology and Growth Gap
Economic growth in Europe was strong until the 1980s but became weaker in the subse-
quent decades. As a result a persistent growth gap between the U.S. and most European
countries has emerged since the 1980s in GDP growth as well as in labor productivity
growth. By taking data on relative manufacturing output per person, Scarpetta et al.
(2000) shows that the productivity level for Germany and other European countries was
converging toward the U.S. level until the 1980s but has diverged since then. At the
same time Europe has lagged behind the U.S. in adoption and usage of new technologies.
Timmer et al. (2003) report that almost all EU countries have been seriously lagging
behind the U.S. in the share of ICT investment in GDP. Consequently, IT capital stocks
are much lower in Europe. It is a well established fact that slower rates of ICT investment
are key in explaining the poorer European productivity performance. Figure 1 illustrates
the strong positive relation between the level of investment in new technologies and labor
productivity growth. van Ark et al. (2002) ﬁnd that ICT contributes nearly as twice as
much to labor productivity growth in the U.S. as in Europe. The total gap in aggregate
productivity growth was 1.09 percentage points in 1995-2000. Roughly 75% of this diﬀer-
ential can be explained by industries that are using new technologies. Lower investment
rates in ICT mean that newer technologies have been adopted less forcefully. In fact Oliner
and Sichel (2000) and Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000) provide convincing evidence that the
U.S.-EU productivity gap can be traced back in large part to the delayed adoption of
new technologies in Europe. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by Daveri (2002), Colecchia and
Schreyer (2002) and van Ark et al. (2002) to mention a few. van Ark et al. (2002), Daveri
(2002) among others ﬁnd that the diﬀusion of new technologies in Europe is following a
similar pattern to those observed in the U.S. but at a considerably slower pace. This
8Figure 1: Investment in new technologies and LPD growth, Data is from van Ark et al.
(2002) and Timmer et al. (2003)
pattern is clearly observable in Table 3. It shows that ICT investment intensities were
increasing in all countries over time but (a) most European countries started investing
in ICT with a signiﬁcant delay and (b) the gap between the U.S. and most European
economies has not narrowed much.
Evidently the slower diﬀusion of new technologies is the principal factor in explain-
ing the weaker European productivity performance. Questions arising in this context
are (a) why is Europe generally lagging behind and (b) what explains the heterogeneous
investment patterns among European countries? There is a bulk of empirical studies,
see for instance McGuckin and van Ark (2001) and McGuckin et al (2005), arguing that
structural impediments in product and labor markets hamper the successful implementa-
tion of new technologies across industries in Europe. These barriers mostly come in the
form of burdensome regulations. Regression estimates by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003)
suggest that strict product market regulations that curb competition hinder the adop-
tion and diﬀusion of new technologies and thus have a negative eﬀect on productivity.
More evidence provided by Gust and Marquez (2002) suggests that countries with more
burdensome regulatory environments tend to adopt new technologies more slowly and
also have slower productivity growth. These studies argue that adoption costs may diﬀer
across countries so that low adjustment cost countries adopt new technologies ﬁrst. This
pattern is also reﬂected in Figure 2 that plots the strictness of an economies regulatory
environment and the degree of technology diﬀusion as measured by the ICT investment
91980 1985 1990 1995 2001
U.S. 2.5 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.2
EU 1.2 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.6
Denmark 1.5 2.3 2.9 3.1 3.6
Finland 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.9 4.3
France 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.4 2.1
Germany 1.3 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.5
Italy 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.5
Netherlands 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.9
Spain 0.9 1.5 2.5 1.7 2.1
Sweden 1.6 2.5 2.7 3.4 4.7
United Kingdom 0.8 1.6 2.3 2.8 3.0
Source: Timmer et al. (2003)
Table 3: ICT investment as a share of GDP
intensity. The measure of regulation (computed by the OECD) captures the degree of an
economy’s regulation in product and labor markets, administrative burdens for start-ups
and the degree of state controls. 5 (1) indicates a very strict (loose) regulation. Clearly,
countries that have a very strict regulatory environment tend to invest less in new tech-
nologies. Gust and Marquez (2002) conﬁrm that diﬀerences in regulations are causal for
the observed cross country heterogeneity in the adoption of new technologies8.
The claim that there is a link between the pace of technology adoption, output growth
and unemployment is supported by the impressive labor market and growth performance
of some European countries like Sweden and the Netherlands9. Both countries exhibit
productivity growth rates that are close to that of the U.S. and in terms of technology
adoption and usage we ﬁnd no evident technology deﬁcit relative to the U.S. At the same
time the unemployment rates of both economies are only slightly higher (Sweden) or even
lower (Netherlands) than the U.S. rate.
8For more evidence on the hypotheses that the lag in technology adoption can be attributed to stricter
regulations in European countries, see Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) and Jerzmanowski (2006).
9The view that slack adoption of new technologies in Europe is causal for the observed slowdown
in productivity and output growth is reﬂected by a recent statement in the European Commission’s
European Competitiveness Report 2001: ”The growing consensus that the strong growth and productivity
performance in the United States is related to increased investment and diﬀusion of ICT goods and services
has raised concerns that the weaker economic performance of EU Member States is caused by sluggishness
in the adoption of these new technologies ...”, (European Commission’s European Competitiveness Report
2001, p. 10).
10Figure 2: Regulation and investment in new technologies, Data is from Nicoletti et al.
(1999) and Timmer et al. (2003)
3 The Model
As an analytical framework I use a vintage technology/vintage human capital model with
frictional labor markets. Firms are heterogeneous with regard to the installed production
technology. When a new job, i.e. a new production unit, is created it adopts the most
advanced technology that is currently available. Each period ﬁrms have the choice of
keeping their old technology, upgrading the existing one, i.e. installing the leading edge
technology or destroying the job. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to their human
capital endowment. Workers accumulate job-speciﬁc skills that are associated with the
particular technology they are working with. These skills are scrapped in the event of
a lay-oﬀ. The accumulation of speciﬁc skills captures the notion of technology learning
that increases the productivity of an existing production unit over time. This feature is
consistent with empirical results. For instance, Jensen et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the gains in
productivity of an existing production plant which are due to the accumulation of expe-
rience are high and signiﬁcant10. The speciﬁcation implies that technologies of diﬀerent
vintages are installed in the economy at the same time. The use of vintage technology is
10They ﬁnd that for a plant that was created in 1967, technology learning accounts for an increase in
own productivity of about 57% over the period 1967 − 1992.
11supported by empirical ﬁndings that evidence a high persistence of ﬁrm’s technology11.
Vintage Technology and Skills
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals that are either workers or en-
trepreneurs. Workers are either employed or unemployed. Individuals are inﬁnitely lived
but they face a constant probability of death that is given by σ. At each point in time,
t, there exists a range of sector-neutral technologies denoted by at,τ ∈ {at,0,at,1,...,at,T}
that diﬀer with respect to their date of creation. The leading edge technology is given
by at,0 whereas at,T is the oldest that is still in use. T can be interpreted as the crit-
ical age at which a technology is scrapped. New technologies arrive at a constant rate
g. Hence at+1,0 = gat,0, where at+1,0 and at,0 denote the leading edge technologies of to-
morrow and today respectively. Newer technologies therefore have a higher productivity.
Each employed worker is equipped with a certain stock of human capital, denoted by h,
that is proportional to the amount of speciﬁc skills that the worker has accumulated on
her current job. Speciﬁc skills, denoted by s, can take values s ∈ {s0,s1,...,sI} where
s0 < ... < sI. s0 and sI are, respectively, the lowest and highest potentially attainable skill
level in the economy. The transition across skill levels is governed by a Markov process
with transition probabilities given by p(s,s0). More precisely, p(s,s0) denotes the prob-
ability that a worker with current skill level s experiences an upgrade of his technology
speciﬁc skills to level s0 where s0 ≥ s. Furthermore, I assume s0 = 0. This condition
says that immediately after the creation of a new production unit or the renovation of an
existing one, i.e. when τ = 0 there exists no job/technology speciﬁc knowledge. This spec-
iﬁcation is supported by empirical evidence provided e.g. by Cochran (1960), Garg and
Milliman (1961), Rusell(1968) and Pegels (1969). They ﬁnd that after a change in ﬁrm’s
production technology, productivity initially drops and then gradually rises. The drop
suggests that production knowledge does not apply equally across the old and the new
production technologies and the subsequent increase evidences the existence of learning.
The stock of human capital embodied in a worker is given by
h = f
h(s) = (1 + αs) (1)
where α > 0. Thus, the function fh is linear in s and satisﬁes the following property:
11Work e.g. by Baily et al. (1992) and Bartelsman and Drymes (1998) suggests that each period
roughly 60% of the ﬁrms keep their current level of technology. Moreover, both studies and the ﬁndings
by Dunne (1994) conﬁrm that plants with poor relative productivity can restructure their technology
and move up in the relative productivity scale. This can be interpreted as clear evidence for ﬁrm’s
updating eﬀorts. More explicitly, Dunne (1994) ﬁnds that old and young plants appear to use advanced
technology at similar frequencies. Given that old plants had installed a diﬀerent technology when they








for τ = 0
for τ > 0
The functional form of fh implies that the returns to learning are positive. This is
consistent with ﬁndings, e.g. by Bahk and Gort (1993) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995).
Bahk and Gort (1993) use plant age as a proxy for the vintage of a technology and ﬁnd
that technology learning accounts for an annual increase in output of 1%12. There is a
single homogeneous consumption good in the economy that is produced by a contiuum
of ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm has a single job that is either vacant or ﬁlled with a worker. Firms
are heterogeneous with regard to the level of technology speciﬁc skills embodied by the
employed worker and the vintage of the implemented technology. When a new ﬁrm is
created it installs the most advanced technology that is available in the economy, i.e. at,0,
hence upon creation τ = 0. Firm’s output is a function of the installed technology and
the worker’s stock of human capital. Therefore, the output of a ﬁrm employing a worker
with skills s that operates a technology of vintage τ is given by
yt(τ,s) = at−τ,τf
h(s) = at−τ,τ (1 + αs) (2)
Jobs can be distinguished along two dimensions, the vintage of the installed technology,
τ and the level of speciﬁc skills embodied in the employed worker, s. In each period ﬁrms
have the choice of keeping their old technology, upgrading the existing one, i.e. installing
the frontier technology or destroying the job. When a ﬁrm decides to upgrade it has to
incur a cost χ that is assumed to depend on the technology gap, i.e. the distance of the




where ξ > 0, µ > 0 and z = 1−g−τ denotes the ﬁrm’s technology gap. Notice that the
width of this gap is determined by the growth rate of the technology frontier - when new
technologies arrive at a more rapid pace then the technology gap widens rather quickly13.
As mentioned previously, workers are equipped with a set of skills and abilities that
enables them to operate the technology they are attached to. This particular form of
human capital, which we call a worker’s production knowledge, is characterized by its
limited transferability across vintages14. Hence in the case of a technology update within
12For a survey on empirical studies of technology learning see Yelle (1979).
13Notice that a ﬁrm’s technology gap can be measured in terms of time, τ, or alternatively in terms of
the productivity diﬀerential, z. For the sake of comparability the latter might prove more useful later on
when the growth rate g will be subject to changes.
14Notice that, even it can be considered as workers human capital it does not show up in Equation
13a ﬁrm there is likely to be a discrepancy between a worker’s current production knowl-
edge and the knowledge that is required to operate the newly installed technology. This
discrepancy can be best understood by considering the limited transferability as an im-
plicit form of human capital obsolescence. The less of a worker’s production knowledge
can be transfered to a new job (that incorporates a more advanced technology) the more
obsolete it is relative to the production knowledge required in that new job. Thus, we
can understand χt(τ) as a form of training costs the ﬁrm has to incur in order to provide
the worker with necessary skills that enables her to operate the new technology. The
convexity of χ follows from the fact that long-tenured workers, that are highly specialized
in their jobs, operate technologies that are already far away from the frontier. Hence, a
substantial investment is made necessary to make the worker’s skills and abilities com-
patible with the new production technology. However, we ﬁnd that the convexity of the
training cost function is not critical for our results. We obtain virtually the same results
for linear costs. Given the paths of the frontier technology and the upgrading costs we
know that when it is optimal for a ﬁrm belonging to skill class s to update at age Ts it
is also optimal at each multiple of Ts. Intuitively, ﬁrm’s incentive to update or not is
driven by the path of the updating costs. If in skill class s it is never optimal to update
then there exists a maximum age T +
s at which it is no longer optimal to keep the current
production technology in operation and thus the job is destroyed. When a ﬁrm renovates
it adopts the leading edge technology, hence τ = 0. This implies that upon upgrading
the currently employed worker looses his technology speciﬁc skills, i.e. s = 015. At the
beginning of a period each ﬁrm and its employee observe the level of embodied skills and
the age of the installed technology. Both parties are involved in a bargaining process that
determines the wage. As a bargaining concept I use Nash bargaining.
Unemployment
When a production unit gets destroyed, either because of exogenous destruction that oc-
curs at the constant rate ρ or endogenously due to technology obsolescence the worker
is released to unemployment. Endogenous destruction occurs when the installed tech-
nology in a particular production unit has reached its maximum age T +
s and updating
was not optimal for the ﬁrm. The use of Nash bargaining implies that any break-up of
existing job/worker pairs is a consensus outcome. Hence we do not observe unilateral
quits by the worker. Upon lay-oﬀ a worker that has accumulated skills s in his previous
(1). This is due to the fact that we consider production knowledge as having a rather abstract nature.
It does not add anything to worker’s productivity but it is ex-ante required to actually start operating a
certain technology.
15Speciﬁc skills are not lost in the sense that they fully depreciate upon lay-oﬀ but they are not
marketable anymore, hence they get implicitly lost.
14occupation is entitled to unemployment beneﬁts denoted by b(s). Beneﬁt payments are
a constant fraction φ of the average after-tax wage within the respective skill class, i.e.
b(s) = φ(1 − τw)
P
τ n(τ,s)ω(τ,s), where n(τ,s) denotes the measure of workers with
skills s that are operating vintage τ. ω(τ,s) denotes the respective wage. Each period,
unemployed face a constant probability, γ, of loosing their beneﬁt receipts. Unemployed
individuals can be distinguished along two dimensions, the amount of job speciﬁc skills
they have accumulated in their previous occupation and their implicit technology gap, i.e.
the relative obsolescence of their production knowledge. Each unemployed individual is
implicitly attached to a certain vintage, i.e. the one that was operated in the last occu-
pation, for which the worker still possesses the respective production knowledge. During
spells of unemployment the workers production knowledge is subject to depreciation, i.e.
it becomes more and more obsolete over time, which is a natural consequence of non-zero
growth in the leading edge technology and the limited transferability property. This im-
plies that when an unemployed gets re-matched with new ﬁrm (that embodies the leading
edge technology) there will be a discrepancy between the individual’s production knowl-
edge and that required to operate the new technology. Notice that the nature of this
discrepancy is exactly the same ﬁrms face when they consider a technology update. As a
result, newly hired workers need to be provided with training.
The Labor Market
The labor market is frictional. This means that at each point in time there exists a
certain number of open vacancies denoted by v and a pool of job-searching individuals,
u. The total number of searcher is given by u =
P
τs,j∈{+,−} uj(τ,s) where j indicates
whether or not the individual receives unemployment beneﬁts, j = {+} or not, j = {−}.
τ indicates the individual’s distance to the frontier and s indicates the amount of skills
accumulated in the previous job16. New matches are determined by a matching function
that is homogeneous of degree one, bounded above by min{v,u} and increasing in its
both arguments.
m = m(v,u) = mv
du
1−d (4)
where m > 0 and d ∈ [0,1]. The probability that a ﬁrm meets an unemployed individual










The last term is implied by the homogeneity assumption on m. Note that θ = v/u is a
16Notice that the terms ”an individual’s distance to the frontier” and ”the degree of obsolescence of
an individual’s production knowledge”, both captured by the variable τ, will be used interchangeably.
15measure of labor market tightness. Similarly, let p denote the probability that a searcher
encounters a vacancy 17.
p = m(v,u)/u = m(θ,1) (6)
The existence of a matching function in the labor market implies that workers looking
for a job trigger a congestion eﬀect on each other. The more individuals are looking for
a job the lower is the probability of encountering a vacancy. The same is true, of course,
for vacancies. Therefore, ﬁrm’s incentive to post a vacancy is strongly aﬀected by the
tightness in the labor market.
Government
The public sector in this economy levies a taxes on labor income and to redistribute the
revenues in the form of unemployment beneﬁts. The government is assumed to run a
balanced budget every period, hence τwWt = Bt, where W is the total wage bill, τw is
the tax on labor income and B denotes total beneﬁt payments.
Value functions
Given capital-embodied growth there exists a natural trend in the model’s key variables.
De-trending by at,0 yields a stationary representation. In order to ﬁll a vacant job ﬁrms
have to actively search for workers. This is done by posting vacancies. Denote with V
the value of a vacancy and let κ be the cost of keeping the vacancy open. Given free
entry, in equilibrium all gains from posting vacancies must be exhausted, hence V = 0.
Or in other words the cost of opening up a vacancy must equal the expected return. The
implied zero-proﬁt condition is









σ is the probability that a worker dies between two consecutive periods, Jj(τ,s) −
χ(τ) is the net value of a new job for a ﬁrm that gets matched with a worker that has
characteristics (j,τ,s). Notice that the term on the right hand side represents the expected
proﬁt. Given the possibility of getting matched with any possible worker the ﬁrm assigns
probabilities to each possible match which are given by Equation (5). Condition (7) pins
down the degree of labor market tightness in equilibrium. The relevant state variables
for a ﬁrm are the level of skills embodied in the worker, s and the age of the installed
technology, τ. Each period a ﬁrm has a choice set, denoted by Υ, which contains the
following actions:
17Notice that all the heterogeneity comes from the workers side, vacancies are all ex-ante the same.
16Υ =

   
   
1−produce with the current technology
2−upgrade to the leading edge technology
0−destroy the job
Given the wage rate ω (τ,s), the value of a job for a ﬁrm that operates vintage τ and
employs a worker with skills s writes:
J(τ,s) = max
Υ∈{0,1,2}










ρ is the rate of exogenous job destruction, τ0 is the next periods age of the installed
technology, β is the discount factor and y (τ,s) − ω (τ,s) denotes instantaneous proﬁts.
When the current production technology is kept in operation, the value of the job next
period is J (τ0,s0) with probability p(s,s0) where s0 ≥ s18. This captures the notion of
worker’s technology learning during employment. If the ﬁrm decides to update it has to
incur training costs χ(τ) that depend on the technology gap, i.e. the ﬁrm’s distance to
the frontier19. A worker’s value function depends on his status of employment.
• E (τ,s) - the value of being employed for an individual with skill level s that is
operating vintage τ
• W j (τ,s) - the value of being unemployed for an individual associated with vintage
τ that was of skill type s when she got laid-oﬀ. If j = {+} (j = {−}), she is (not)
entitled to unemployment beneﬁts
Exogenous job destruction does not apply to newly matched job/worker pairs. Hence,
a job/worker relation can not break up for exogenous reasons immediately after the match.
The value of being unemployed - that is conditional on the worker’s beneﬁt entitlement -
can be written as
W
+(τ,s) = b(s) + βg(1 − σ){p(θ)E







18Note that p(I,I) = 1. This is implied by the assumption that during employment there is no
depreciation of speciﬁc skills.
19Note that the net post-update value of a ﬁrm is equal to the value of a new production unit that has
been formed with a worker that was entitled to unemployment beneﬁts, hence j = {+}.
17W
−(τ,s) = βg(1 − σ){p(θ)E





Note that with probability p(θ) a worker encounters a vacancy which results in a
match. The value of such as match for a worker is denoted by Ej(τ,s). If no match takes
place in the current period the individual might loose his unemployment beneﬁts with
probability γ. Notice that we have to keep track of a worker’s beneﬁt entitlement because
in the case of a match it will determine a worker’s bargaining power in the wage bargain.
A worker not receiving beneﬁts has a lower outside option and has, therefore, also a lower






1−stay with the current employer
0−quit
First, for notational convenience let’s deﬁne the surplus of a job for a worker that
stays with the current ﬁrm.
¯ E (τ,s) = (1 − τ













The value is determined by the worker’s after-tax wage income and the present value
of the future surplus. If the ﬁrm/worker relation survives to the next period the plant
might enjoy an appreciation of the worker’s skill level that occurs with probability p(s,s0).
This is captured by the ﬁrst term inside the bracket. The realized value of employment
for a worker is dependent on the actual action of the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur
plans to update (keep) the technology, i.e. Υ = 2 (Υ = 1), the worker compares his





maxΞ∈{0,1}{ ¯ E (0,0),W +(τ,s)} if Υ = 2
maxΞ∈{0,1}{ ¯ E (τ,s),W +(τ,s)} if Υ = 1
Notice that when deciding on Ξ the worker always considers his current outside option
as the relevant one. Also in the case of Υ = 2. The cooperative nature of decision making
within this framework implies that the ﬁrm/worker pair seeks to maximize the joint
surplus of the job at each point in time. No action can be taken against the will of a
particular party. When we take the joint surplus of each joint action as the underlying
18value for comparison we get the following condition





Note that what counts for the worker is the net surplus of an update that is given
by E+ (τ,s) − W + (τ,s). If his current outside option is high relative to the post-update
value of the job then the update might not take place. To make the worker agree on an
change in the technology the gain in the job-value must be suﬃciently high to compensate
the worker for a potential reduction in her current outside option20. Conditional on the
decision that was taken, the joint surplus of a job, deﬁned by Ω(·,·), is given by
Ω(τ,s) =

   
   
J (τ,s) + E (τ,s) − W + (τ,s)
J+ (τ,s) + E+ (τ,s) − W + (τ,s) − χ(τ)
0
if Υ = 1 ∧ Ξ = 1
if Υ = 2 ∧ Ξ = 1
otherwise
Optimizing behavior
The objective of each worker is to maximize expected wealth that is given by the inﬁnite






Conditional on the employment status, i ∈ {e-employed, u-unemployed} and the
beneﬁt entitlement status, j ∈ {+,−} a worker faces the following constraint
y
w = I (i = e)(1 − τ
w)ω (τ,i) + I (i = u)I (j = +)b(s) (13)
where I (i = ·) and I (j = ·) are an indicator functions that shape the constraint ac-
cording to the worker’s actual employment and beneﬁt status. Without loss of generality
I assume the existence of just one entrepreneur that receives all the proﬁts generated in
the economy. Given that there is no capital accumulation, the entrepreneur’s objective is
to maximize the inﬁnite stream of future income
20Notice that, a generous unemployment insurance scheme that naturally creates a valuable worker’s
outside option could potentially create delays in the adoption of new technologies. This is due to the
fact that with a high replacement rate φ and for certain combinations of states (τ,s) we likely see the
case W+ (τ,s) > W+ (0,0) which implies that workers might not be willing to exchange their high








e = Π −
X
˜ τ
v(˜ τ)κ − C (15)
The entrepreneur’s income is given by proﬁt income Π net of total training costs, C
and vacancy costs.
Wage setting
In the bargaining process a job/worker pair chooses the wage rate in order to maximize






We need to distinguish two cases, (a) ﬁrm/worker pairs that continue an existing
relation and (b) newly matched pairs. The diﬀerence stems from (a) the existence of
training costs a ﬁrm has to pay after a match and (b) the underlying characteristics of
the worker the ﬁrm got matched with. Newly matched workers diﬀer with respect to
τ and s and so does their outside option in the ﬁrst-period wage bargain. From the
second period onwards a worker’s current outside option is uncoupled from her previous
employment history. As a result we get a two-tier wage system that contains two wage
functions - one for continuing relationships and one for newly matched job/worker pairs.






η indicates the ﬁrm’s weight in the bargain. As before, J(τ,s) is the value of a job for
a ﬁrm and E(τ,s) − W + (τ,s) is the net value of employment for a worker. Optimality
implies that






Using the value function given by Equations (8) and (11) and the optimality condition
(18) that has to hold for all pairs of (τ,s) we can write the wage as
20ω(τ,s) = {(1 − η)y(τ,s) + η

W




























j(τ,s) = {(1 − η)(y(0,0) − χ(τ)) + η

W













4 Solving the model
The solution to the model is a set of policy functions that characterize the optimal decision
behavior of workers, ﬁrms, and ﬁrms with dormant jobs. The relevant state variables for
an existing job/worker pair are the vintage of the installed technology τ and the level of
speciﬁc skills s. Given a certain state (τ,s) the policy function gives the optimal decision
that maps into the action space given by {keep on producing, update the technology,
destroy the job}. Notice that decisions are takes jointly. The free entry condition that
results in the zero (expected) proﬁt condition implicitly determines the vacancy posting
behavior of ﬁrms with a dormant job. Notice that when optimizing, ﬁrms and unemployed
take matching probabilities as given. Solving the model reduces to ﬁnding a ﬁxed point
(τw,θ) that balances the government budget constraint - and yields ex-post matching
probabilities that are consistent with agents’ ex-ante beliefs. The algorithm that is con-
structed to this end is structured in the following way. In an inner loop agents solve their
maximization problem taking the tax rate τw and the tightness θ as given. At the end of
each loop one can compute the stationary distributions of ﬁrms, workers and unemployed
across vintages and skill levels and use this information to update the value of θ leaving
the tax rate unchanged. The inner loop has converged when the value of θ is found that is
consistent with agents’ prior beliefs. Using the stationary distributions one can compute
aggregate variables, including total government expenditures and revenues. In an outer
loop, these values are subsequently used to update the guess of τw in a way such that
the government budget constraint is balanced. Once the ﬁxed point in τw is found the
model is solved. Hence we can characterize the equilibrium of the model as follows. The
21equilibrium consists of
• a wage schedule ω(τ,s) and a ﬁrm’s policy function T(τ,s) that maps into the action
space {keep, update, destroy}, so that the joint surplus of each ﬁrm/worker pair is
maximized
• a labor market tightness θ that ensures zero expected proﬁts from posting vacancies
and
• a tax rate τw that guarantees a balanced government budget.
5 Calibration
The model period is set equal to half a quarter. In total there are 13 parameters (see
Table 4) to be calibrated. Seven of them, (β,σ,η,α,λ,d,ξ,g), are calibrated ”externally”
by using existing micro-evidence. The discount factor β = 0.9945 is chosen so that
the implied annualized real interest equals 4.5%. People of working age face a constant
probability of dying σ = 0.0025. Hence, on average, they spend 50 years in the labor force.
Firm’s bargaining weight, η is equal to 0.5 which is also the elasticity of the matching
function with respect to the stock of vacancies. The value of α = 0.3347 is chosen so that
the progress ratio i.e the ratio of peak to initial productivity is equal to 1.2. Jovanovic and
Nyarko (1995) report progress ratios from dozen empirical studies. Their suggested range
is 1.14 − 2.9. Given that 1.2 is a rather conservative choice we will consider alternative
values in Section 7. Calibrating the parameters of the cost function is not an easy task
given that the empirical literature is silent regarding training/updating costs. However,
there exists a consensus that training costs are a convex function of the technology gap21.
Therefore, I set ξ = 1. The choice of the second parameter in the cost function µ will
be discussed shortly. The transition probabilities of the Markov process governing skill
accumulation are calibrated so that intra-ﬁrm technology learning lasts, on average, for
10 years. This value is consistent with ﬁndings by Bahk and Gort (1993) who report that
intra-ﬁrm capital and organizational learning continues for up to 10 years after birth22.
Four parameters - (κ,ρ,m,µ) - are calibrated internally which means that their values are
choosen such that the steady state generated by the model matches certain features of the
U.S. economy for the period before 1975. The pre-1975 steady state of the laissez-faire
economy (henceforth LS) generates (1) an average duration of unemployment of 11.4 weeks
which is consistent with BLS-data for the period 1960-75, (2) an average vacancy duration
of 6.5 weeks as reported by van Ours and Ridder (1992), (3) a technology adoption cost
21However, as mentioned previously, the convexity of the cost function is not critical for our results.
22The lower (upper) bound of the range of attainable skills is set equal s0 = 0 (sI = 0.2).
22to GDP ratio of 2.4% as estimated by Bessen (2002) for 1973 and (4) and unemployment
rate of 4%. The semi-quarterly vacancy cost κ = 0.14076 compares to 1.5 months of
wage payment. A value that is in line with ﬁndings by Bentitola and Bertola (1990)
and Felbermayer and Prat (2007). Exogenous layoﬀs occur with probability ρ = 0.0212,
i.e. once every 5.9 years. For the welfare-state (henceforth WS) there are two more
parameters to calibrate. The replacement rate is set equal to 45%. The OECD reports
replacement rate for the early 1970s in Europe lying in the range between 30% (Germany)
and 50% (Netherlands). The semi-quarterly probability of loosing the beneﬁt entitlement
is γ = 0.0417. Hence, people receive beneﬁts, on average, for 3 years. As a benchmark I set
the annual growth rate of embodied technical change equal to 2.5%. Given the diﬀerences
in the institutions, the same LS job destruction rate ρ rate generates a steady state
unemployment rate of 5.2% in the WS economy. However, average unemployment until
the early 70s in Europe was around 3.5%. To account for this fact we follow Hornstein et
al. (2007) and recalibrate the separation rate for the WS economy. One might conjecture
that introducing layoﬀ taxes - as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) - would be equally
successful in resolving the problem. As emphasised by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
layoﬀ taxes reduce incentives to create jobs and to destroy them. The net eﬀect on
labor market tightness and hence on unemployment turns out to be ambiguous. In this
framework however, a ﬁring tax payed by the ﬁrm in the event of an endogenous or an
exogenous separation would inevitably raise unemployment. This is due to the fact that,
for the current calibration, there exists no endogenous job destruction in equilibrium.
The only source of job destruction is exogenous separations. Hence the channel through
which ﬁring taxes could potentially lower unemployment, i.e. via locking workers into
their jobs, does not take eﬀect. As a result, layoﬀ taxes would only decrease the surplus
of a job for a ﬁrm and consequently depress job creation. In order to match low European
unemployment in the 70s we set the semi-quarterly separation rate ρ = 0.0137. A welcome
sideﬀect of lowering ρ is that in this way we automatically increase the average duration
of unemployment in the WS economy. As reported by Machin and Manning (1999) the
duration of unemployment in European countries was substantially higher relative to the
U.S. already in the 1970s. We, therefore, believe that our calibration very well captures
the main characteristics of (and diﬀerences between) European and U.S. labor markets.
6 Results
The focus of this paper is on providing a proper understanding of the links between ﬁrms’
technology adoption behavior, labor market institutions and the labor market perfor-
mance of an economy. The analysis was motivated by the fact that there are substantial
23Explanation Variable Value
Discount Factor β 0.9945
Probability of dying σ 0.0025
Firm’s bargaining weight η 0.5
Vacancy cost κ 0.14076
Parameter of production function α 0.3347
Parameter of matching function m 0.7702
Parameter of matching function d 0.5
Parameters of cost function ξ 1
Growth rate of technology frontier g 0.025
LS WS
Separation rate ρ 0.0212 0.0137
Parameter of cost function µ 0.024 0.024-0.057
Replacement rate φ 0 0.45
Probability of loosing beneﬁt entitlement γ - 0.0417
Table 4: Parameter Values (One period is half a quarter)
and highly persistent diﬀerences in unemployment rates between major European coun-
tries and the U.S. These diﬀerences emerged after the late 1970’s at a time when there
was a major increase in the arrival rate of new technologies. Given these observations it is
clear that we need to evaluate the model along two diﬀerent dimensions. First we need to
consider a pre-1975 period that is characterized by a low rate of arrival of new technolo-
gies. The outcomes of this scenario are then put in contrast with the results of a post-1975
scenario where the arrival rate is high. Secondly, in order to mimic the existing technology
gap between (and among certain) European countries and the U.S. we need to account for
diﬀerences in technology updating which is done by considering various diﬀerent updating
cost scenarios. It is not the aim of the paper to explain why Europe has been lagging
behind the U.S. in the implementation and usage of new technologies but it takes the
existing technology gap as given and seeks to analyze its consequences for the local labor
markets. As mentioned at the outset, cross-country diﬀerences in the frequency of tech-
nology updating are likely to be the result of diﬀerent regulatory environments. There is
considerable empirical evidence arguing that restrictive regulatory practices in a number
of European countries have impinged on ﬁrm’s incentives to adopt new technologies by
raising the costs of a technology upgrade and therefore slowing down the rate of adoption.
These studies together with Figures 2 suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity in
the nature of regulatory environments across European countries which translates into
diﬀerences in the underlying adoption-cost structure. In light of this we consider diﬀer-
ent cost scenarios for the WS economies in order to mimic the observed heterogeneity in
technology adoption across European economies. To this end we pick values for the cost
parameter µ in the range 0.024−0.057. This range yields average updating costs that are
24comparable with 4.21 − 13.49 weeks of average ﬁrst period post-update wage payments.
Higher costs curb ﬁrms’ incentives to adopt new technologies, hence we observe ﬁrms with
higher costs updating their production technology relatively less frequently. This pattern
is reﬂected in Table 5 which depicts pre-75 outcomes of the calibrated matching model
and contrasts the results of the aissez-faire economy with that of the diﬀerent scenarios
of the welfare-state economy.
L-F, pre 75 Welfare state, pre 75
Benchmark: g = 2.5%
Distance to Laissez-Faire, in quarters 0 0.22 2.02 4.37 6.16 8.03 10.2
Average time until update, in quarters 14.44 14.66 16.46 18.81 20.6 22.41 24.64
Average distance to tech. frontier 8.59 8.93 9.6 10.2 10.83 11.44 11.97
Unemployment rate, in % 4.02 3.48 3.73 3.97 4.24 4.58 4.94
Duration of unemployment, in weeks 11.54 14.43 15.51 16.55 17.74 19.2 20.81
% of unemployed w/ spells ≤ 3 months 81.05 69.94 66.43 63.31 60.05 56.43 53.34
% of unemployed w/ spells [6, 12) months 3.46 8.22 10.00 11.65 13.41 15.38 17.03
% of unemployed w/ spells ≥ 12 months 0.13 0.82 1.27 1.81 2.55 3.59 4.9
Equilibrium tax rate, in % 0 1.28 1.37 1.45 1.54 1.65 1.77
L-F: Laissez-Faire Economy (φ = 0), Welfare State Economy (φ = 0.45)
Table 5: Steady states for the period before 1975
Given the benchmark parametrisation ﬁrms in both economies update their production
technology every 14.44 quarters in the LS economy and - depending on the respective
cost structure - every 14.66 − 24.64 quarters in the WS economy. As a consequence of
diﬀerent costs the WS suﬀers from a technology deﬁcit relative to the LS in the range
0 − 10 quarters23. Given the frequency of updates the implied technology gap - i.e. the
average distance of ﬁrms to the leading edge technology ranges from 8.59−11.97 quarters.
Diﬀerences in adoption costs, that translate into diﬀerent updating frequencies do, of
course, not leave labor market variables unaﬀected. For the purpose of understanding
how diﬀerences in ﬁrms technology choice spill over to the labor market we ﬁrst deﬁne
two concepts that will prove useful also later on. Denote with zu the average technology
gap (i.e. the average degree of skill obsolescence) of unemployed individuals. This is given
by
zu = (Σs,j,zu(s,j,z)z)/u
and second let ctr denote expected training costs a ﬁrm has to incur in the event of a
23Notice that a deﬁcit of 6 quarters between two economies means that the straggler updates its
technology, on average, 6 quarters later than the leader.
25match, which we can write as24
ctr = (Σs,j,zu(s,j,z)χ(z))/u
Recall that there exists a one-to-one mapping between the maximum age of a technology
T and the corresponding critical technology gap at which it’s optimal for a ﬁrm to reno-
vate, i.e. z∗ = 1 − g−T. Therefore, diﬀerences in updating frequencies directly translate
into diﬀerent values of z∗, see rows 1 − 2 in Table 6. Clearly, as the updating horizon
expands production technologies are kept in operation for a longer period of time. Hence,
the average technology gap of ﬁrms increases, i.e. ﬁrms production technologies are, on
average, further away from the frontier. This, however, implies that also workers that
are attached to these technologies while being employed exhibit a higher degree of skill
obsolescence. As jobs get destroyed these workers transit to unemployed and hence also
the average degree of skill obsolescence in the pool of unemployed individuals will be
higher, see the third row in Table 6. In other words, as z∗ rises the distribution of unem-
ployed (across z) shifts to the right, hence the mass of individuals with relatively more
obsolete skills rises. The degree of skill obsolescence of an unemployed worker determines
the amount of training that is required in the event of match. Consequently, a higher
degree of skill obsolescence in the pool of unemployed implies that ﬁrms can expect larger
training expenses when opening up a new vacancy. The fourth row in Table 6 reveals
that, depending on the cost regime, expected training costs amount to 6.79% − 17.8%
of ﬁrm’s output. Larger job creation costs reduce incentives to post vacancies (see the
ﬁfth row in Table 6) and, consequently, lead to higher unemployment (which ranges from
3.48%−4.9%). Higher unemployment is accompanied by a rise in the average duration of
unemployment. The percentage of jobless workers with spells less or equal than 3 months
in the laissez-faire economy is around 81.05% which is consistent with U.S. data (81.57%,
see OECD). The ﬁgures for the WS outcome are substantially lower (53.34% − 69.94%).
This is in line with ﬁndings by Machin and Manning (1999). They report that the dura-
tion of unemployment in Europe was substantially higher than in the U.S. already in the
1970s. The model does well also in predicting the proportion of long-term unemployed
in the LS economy. The ﬁgure produced by the model, i.e. 3.46% is close to U.S. data,
i.e. 4.58%. The ﬁgure for the WS is substantially higher - i.e. it ranges from 8.22% -
17.03% - emphazising that long-term unemployment was a severe problem for European
economies already in the 70s.
On the whole, the steady states for the laissez-faire and the welfare-state economy
24Recall that u(s,j,z) is the mass of jobless workers with previous skills s, beneﬁt entitlement j and
gap z. z deﬁnes the technology gap in terms of the productivity diﬀerential, i.e. z = 1 − e−gτ and u is
the total mass of unemployed workers.
26LS WS
Average time until update, in quarters 14.4 14.6 16.5 18.8 20.6 22.4 24.6
Average z∗ at update, in % 8.63 8.75 9.77 11.1 12.1 13.1 14.3
zu, in % 7.39 8.44 8.93 9.35 9.81 10.3 10.7
Average job creation costs, in % of ﬁrm’s output 7.14 6.79 8.81 10.7 12.7 15.2 17.8
Vacancy/employment ratio, v
1−u, in % 2.25 1.23 1.15 1.08 1.01 0.93 0.86
Unemployment rate, in % 4.02 3.48 3.73 3.97 4.24 4.58 4.94
Table 6: Comparison of cost regimes, pre 75
generated by the baseline parametrisation can consistently capture the main features of
European and U.S. labor markets of the period before 1975.
One of the stylized facts presented at the outset reveals that, in the late 1970’s, there was
a substantial acceleration in capital-embodied technical change. To pattern technology
growth in the post-75 period we increase the growth rate of the technology frontier,
i.e. we set g = 4%. Given that the ﬁrm’s decision to adopt a new piece of technology
is state and not time dependent we would expect agents to update more frequently in
periods of rapid technical change. State-dependency in this context implies that if it
is optimal for a ﬁrm to update at a certain critical size of the technology gap, i.e. z∗
than increasing g just means that the same critical gap is already reached at a lower
τ. However, as argued previously a higher rate of arrival of new technologies raises the
issue of compatibility problems between vintages and therefore adjustment costs are likely
to rise. To account for the increase in adoption costs in the post-75 period, for which
Bessen (2002) provides empirical evidence, we re-calibrate the cost parameter µ and set
µ = 0.0668. This generates a steady state adoption cost to output ratio of 6.5% which
is the same as that of the U.S. in the period after 1975 as reported by Bessen (2002).
Given the lack of similar estimates for European countries we determine µ for each of
the WS scenarios in the following way. Bessen (2002), Cummins and Violante (2002) and
Yorukoglu (1998) among others argue that the rise in adoption costs is due to vintage-
speciﬁc compatibility problems that are triggered by higher rates of technical change.
Given that the rate of embodied technical change increased uniformly in the U.S. and
in Europe we should observe the same compatibility problems in European countries as
well. Hence we can expect European ﬁrms being confronted with an increase in costs of a
similar order of magnitude as those in the U.S. In the calibration we, therefore, pick the
post-75 value of µ so that the relative increase in updating costs for each of the diﬀerent
updating scenarios in the WS case exactly matches the increase in costs in the laissez-faire
economy. Table 7 depicts the post-75 steady states of the laissez-faire economy and the
diﬀerent scenarios of the welfare state.
Column 1 in Table 7 shows that an increase in capital-embodied technical change
raises unemployment in the laissez-faire economy by about 2.27 percentage points. This
27L-F, post 75 Welfare state, post 75
Post 75: g = 4%
Distance to Laissez-Faire, in quarters 0 -1.55 1.26 3.93 6.73 9.61 12.85
Average time until update, in quarters 20.74 19.1 22.01 24.68 27.47 30.35 33.59
Average distance to tech. frontier 9.18 9.15 10.09 10.92 11.76 12.64 13.54
Unemployment rate, in % 6.29 5.48 6.54 7.61 8.84 10.38 12.22
Duration of unemployment, in weeks 18.47 23.22 28.03 32.95 38.82 46.36 55.72
% of unemployed w/ spells ≤ 3 months 58.2 48.42 41.42 36.45 31.25 26.44 22.36
% of unemployed w/ spells [6, 12) months 14.42 19.52 22.54 24.08 24.93 24.38 23.94
% of unemployed w/ spells ≥ 12 months 3.05 7.09 11.87 16.9 22.62 29.72 36.33
Equilibrium tax rate, in % 0 1.94 2.27 2.58 2.93 3.34 3.81
L-F: Laissez-Faire Economy (φ = 0), Welfare State Economy (φ = 0.45)
Table 7: Steady states for the period after 1975
matches very well the post-75 increase in U.S. unemployment. In the data we see a jump
in U.S. unemployment in the late 1970’s that leads to an average unemployment of 6.38%
for the period 1975-200025. The increase in unemployment is fueled by an increase in
the duration of unemployment which is also well reﬂected by the data. In the period
1975-2005 the average spell of unemployment lasted for 15.33 weeks which is slightly less
then what the model predicts. Not surprisingly the increase in costs leads to a fall in the
frequency of technology updates. In the post-75 scenario ﬁrms update on average every
20.74 quarters which is roughly 6 quarters later than in the baseline case. Comparing the
ﬁrst columns in Table 5 and in Table 7 we can make the observation that the simulated
rise in the arrival rate of new technologies that triggered a rise in updating costs had,
on the whole, a rather modest impact on the performance of the labor market in the LS
economy. This suggests that the economy did not switch to a diﬀerent steady state after
the jump of arrival rate in the late 1970’s. The eﬀects in the WS economy, however, are
more diverse. Columns 2 − 7 in Table 7 reveal that the change in unemployment that
occurs in response to an acceleration in capital-embodied growth depends crucially on
an economy’s ex-ante technology updating frequency. For the moment, let’s focus on the
outcomes in columns 4−8. Increasing g to 4% and allowing for an initial technology gap of
4 quarters drives up unemployment to 7.61%. A gap of 6 years results in 8.84% whereas a
gap of 10 quarters pushes up unemployment to 12.22%. These ﬁgures broadly match post-
75 unemployment rates of major European welfare state economies that exhibit a sizable
technology deﬁcit. Examples are Germany (7.31%), France (10.23%) or Italy (10.74%).
The results in columns 2−3 in Table 7 reveal that unemployment rates in a welfare state
economy that provides generous unemployment insurance need not necessarily be high.
25Unemployment in the U.S. was above average mainly in the 80s and early 90s. Our model can account
for this movement but not for the subsequent decrease that started in the mid-90s.
28In both speciﬁcations the cost parameter µ implies updating frequencies that are virtually
the same as those in the LF economy. Thus, there is virtually no technology deﬁcit. The
unemployment rates we get in this case are between 5.48% − 6.54% which is not too far
from the LS economy but, more importantly, it is substantially lower than the rates in
welfare states that suﬀer from signiﬁcant technology gaps. Therefore, the key factor that
determines the level of unemployment is clearly the frequency of technology updates. The
intuition for that will be provided shortly. Furthermore, unemployment beneﬁts are not
the main driving force of high rates of unemployment but they are rather a factor that
promotes their emergence in economies that have sluggish technology updating. A closer
look at European labor markets reveals that economies that provide generous beneﬁt
payments but exhibit a zero - or just a small technology gap perform remarkably in
terms of labor market indicators. Notable examples are Sweden (with an unemployment
rate of 5.27%), Netherlands (5.72%) or UK (7.47%). Our model can reproduce this
pattern reasonably well. The percentage of unemployed with spells greater or equal
than 6 months in the welfare state with low frequency updating ranges from 40.98%
to 60.27% which is broadly consistent with actual data for welfare states like Germany
(39%), Spain (51.6%) or France (55.1%)26. Likewise, the results for welfare states with
high frequency updating (26.61% − 34.41%) can match up real-world counterparts like
Sweden (25.44%) or Austria (37.75%). Also the result for the LS economy (i.e. 17.47%)
is consistent with the corresponding U.S. ﬁgure, (15.53%)27. It is well known that the
persistent increase in European unemployment rates was primarily driven by an increase
in the fraction of long-term unemployed. Inﬂow rates into unemployment were roughly the
same in the pre- and the post-1980’s era. Outﬂow rates i.e. the hazard rates of gaining
employment, however, dropped signiﬁcantly after the late 1970’s. As a consequence,
the duration of unemployment and therefore the fraction of long-term unemployed was
rising. This phenomenon is captured well by our model. The results in Table 7 show that
both indicators experience a signiﬁcant increase in the post-75 period. The duration of
unemployment was generally low in the pre-75 era but experienced a dramatic increase as
the rate of arrival of new technologies started to accelerate. The positive relation between
the time that passes by until ﬁrms update their production technology and the level of
unemployment is depicted in Figure 3. There, the solid and the dashed lines graph the
outcomes of the welfare state for the pre-75 and the post-75 era respectively. The Figure
has to be read as follows. Each point on the solid line represents a particular pre-75 cost
scenario that generates a certain a technology gap and a rate of unemployment28. After a
shock to capital-embodied technical change the economy jumps to the point on the dashed
26See Table 1 in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002)
27Data is taken from the OECD
28Note that the indication of gaps in the ﬁgure corresponds to pre-75 gaps.
29line that is exactly above the respective pre-75 location on the solid line. Evidently, as
the rate of arrival of new technologies accelerates unemployment in the WS reaches high
levels rather quickly as the technology gap widens.
Figure 3: Unemployment Rates
Notice that unemployment rates increase more than proportionally for economies that
feature less frequent technology updating. To better understand the intuition behind
this important result we make use again of the two concepts we employed previously
to interpret pre-75 results, i.e. the average degree of skill obsolescence of unemployed
individuals, zu and the expected training costs for ﬁrms, ctr. Moreover, in order to get a
more complete picture of the driving mechanism we perform the following counter factual
analysis. In a ﬁrst step we increase just the growth rate of the technology frontier g to 4%,
and leave the cost parameter µ unchanged hence we disregard the issue of compatibility.
In this way we are able to isolate the eﬀects stemming solely from an acceleration of the
arrival rate of new technologies. The results are represented by the ﬁrst rows in Panels
I-III in Table 8. Notice that the numbers indicate the change relative to pre-75 outcomes.
In the second step we, likewise, set g to 4% but we also account for compatibility issues by
changing the cost parameter µ. In this step we set µ so that the resulting adoption cost to
GDP ratio in the LS economy equals 4.5%. This is less than in the benchmark scenario for
which that ratio was 6.5%. Hence the problems of compatibility considered are less severe
relative to the benchmark. The results of this step are given by the respective second rows
in Table 8. For matters of comparability, we also report the outcome of the benchmark
30scenario in the respective third rows. The key element for understanding the divergence
of unemployment rates across economies is the post-75 response of a ﬁrm’s critical gap,
i.e. z∗. As we saw previously, z∗ determines the degree of skill obsolescence in the pool of
unemployed, zu, and hence also aﬀects the expected training costs for ﬁrms, ctr. Training
costs drive job creation and, therefore, inﬂuence also unemployment through their impact
on ﬁrms vacancy posting behavior. From the second column in Table 8 we can infer
that the critical gap z∗ increases for all scenarios, even in the case of constant costs29.
Notice that economies which feature slow technology updating experience a more than
proportional increase in the critical gap. The explanation for that is intuitive. Notice ﬁrst
that the value of an existing ﬁrm gradually declines over time as its production technology
ages30. It continues to decline until the ﬁrm’s technology gap reaches its critical size, i.e.
z∗, at which the technology gets scrapped. The wage payed within a ﬁrm is proportional
to the plant’s current (relative) productivity, i.e. ω(τ,s) ∝ y(τ,s) = ¯ ag−τ(1 + αs), see
Equation (19). As the productivity of new vintages grows faster, implied by a higher g,
wages payed within ﬁrms drop. The longer the updating horizon of a ﬁrm the longer the
time period for which it will beneﬁt from lower wages. Hence ﬁrms with less frequent
updating (i.e. ﬁrms that face higher costs of updating their technology) will beneﬁt
more relative to ﬁrms that update frequently31. This causes a relatively slower decline
of the ﬁrm’s value as its technology ages. As a result technologies will be kept longer
in operation, hence they reach a relatively higher degree of obsolescence. Consequently,
the increase in the size of the critical gap will be larger in economies that update less
frequently32. Notice that this eﬀect gets more pronounced as we consider also the issue of
vintage compatibility (represented by the middle and far right number in each column).
The intuition is the following. First note that according to Equation (8) it is optimal
for a ﬁrm to update when the current surplus J(z,·) equals the value of a ﬁrm that has
just updated, i.e. J+(·,·) − χ(z)33. Costs increase uniformly in both updating scenarios.
However, since J(z,·) declines less fast in the slow updating environment the critical
gap, at which J(z∗,·) = J+(·,·) − χ(z∗) holds, increases by more than that in the fast
29Recall that the critical gap is deﬁned as z∗ = 1 − e−gT where T indicates the maximum age of a
technology. For constant costs T naturally decreases as it is optimal for ﬁrms to update earlier. This
decrease, however, is outweighed by the increase in the growth rate g so that the overall impact on z∗ is
negative. As costs increase the maximum age T decreases by less or even rises. Hence in the scenarios
that consider also compatibility problems the critical gap z∗ rises by more.
30This is a consequence of technology obsolescence caused by ongoing productivity advancements at
the technology frontier.
31Average wages drop by 6.22% in an economy with frequent updating compared to 11.81% in an
economy with sluggish adoption.
32There is also a second eﬀect that comes through a standard capitalisation eﬀect. A higher g increases
a ﬁrm’s surplus by lowering the eﬀective discount rate. Again, ﬁrms with a longer updating horizon will
beneﬁt more from lower discounting.
33Hence, z∗ is deﬁned as z∗ : J(z∗,·) = J+(·,·) − χ(z∗).
31updating economy. Using the same logic we have developed previously it is straightforward
to understand the remaining ﬁgures in Table 8. In eﬀect, these results are mostly implied
by the response of the critical gap z∗. Recall that z∗ determines the degree of skill
obsolescence in the pool of unemployed, zu. Hence, the more than proportional rise in
z∗ for late-updating economies translates into a relatively stronger increase in the degree
of workers skill obsolescence zu (see column 3 in Table 8). This pushes training costs
and consequently dampens ﬁrms vacancy posting. As a result, the decline in job creation
and therefore, the rise in unemployment is more severe for economies with less frequent
technology updating.
Cost ∆z∗ in %p ∆zu in %p ∆JCC, in % ∆ v
1−u, in % u, in %
Panel I: LS
= +3.3 +2.1 +2.4 -9.1 4.4
4.5 +5.3 +2.8 +5.3 -17.5 4.8




= +3 +2.3 +2.4 -9.7 3.8
4.5 +4.4 +2.9 +5.1 -18.1 4.2




= +4.8 +3.8 +6.9 -20.7 6.1
4.5 +7.3 +5.2 +14.9 -35.8 7.3
6.5 +14.3 +9.4 +41.3 -62.6 11.6
z∗
WS − z∗
LS - indicates the technology gap relative to the LS case, %p = change in
percentage points, ∆z∗ = change in ﬁrm’s critical gap, u = unemployment rate,
∆ v
1−u = change in vacancy/employment ratio, ∆JCC = change in expected costs of
job creation, ∆zu = change in average degree of unemployed skill obsolescence
Table 8: Counterfactual Analysis
7 Sensitivity Analysis
The role of unemployment insurance
The existence of generous unemployment beneﬁts is a widely used argument to explain
high rates of European unemployment. It is further argued that the removal or a reduction
of these would substantially contribute to an improvement in the performance of local
labor markets. Evidently, cutting beneﬁts in our model would, for suﬃciently sluggish
updating, deﬁnitely decrease unemployment. However, the results depicted in Table 7,
show that even within a welfare state that provides generous payments, low levels of
unemployment are achievable. If ﬁrms in the welfare state renovate at the same frequency
as ﬁrms in the LS economy then the increase in unemployment is slightly higher than
32under LS though, the unemployment rate however, levels out at relatively moderate levels.
Based on these observations we may suppose that what matters for an economy’s level of
unemployment is primarily the rate of technology turnover or the speed with which ﬁrms
adopt newly available technologies. The generosity of publicly provided unemployment
insurance is rather of second order importance only. To provide further support for this
hypotheses we conduct another experiment in which we vary the level of generosity of
unemployment insurance. To this end we pick replacement rates of φ ∈ {0,0.25} and
compare the outcomes with those of the benchmark34. The results of this experiment
are depicted in Table 9. For matters of comparability we depict just the two extreme
cost cases, i.e. the ones that yield technology gaps of 0 and 10 quarters relative to the
LS economy. For the two cases (organized in Panels I and II) we report the results of
each policy regime, i.e. φ ∈ {0,0.25,0.45}. The second column contains the change in
unemployment that occurs in response to a shocks to embodied technical change. The
order of magnitude of this shock is the same as in the previous sections, i.e. gpost75 = 4%.
Evidently, the degree of generosity of unemployment insurance (as measured by φ) plays
a rather limited role for explaining both, the post-75 increase in unemployment and
the divergence of unemployment rates across OECD countries. In the case of frequent
updating (see Panel I) the response of unemployment is virtually independent of generosity
of unemployment insurance (henceforth UI). In the benchmark case, i.e. φ = 0.45, only
0.55 percentage points of the total post-75 increase in unemployment are due to the
existence of UI. Panel II that depicts the results for sluggish updating suggests a slightly
higher inﬂuence of beneﬁts - 2.37 percentage points of the increase are due to UI - but a
large portion of the increase remains to be primarily explained by ﬁrms technology choice.
The reason why beneﬁts have a bigger impact in the case of slow updating is intuitive. The
existence of (generous) UI naturally increases the duration of unemployment, see Column
3 in Table 9. For z∗
WS−z∗
LS = 10 the diﬀerence in the duration is more pronounced than in
the case of z∗
WS−z∗
LS = 0 since job creation is naturally lower. Or in other words the more
ﬂuid nature of the labor market in the latter case makes it less vulnerable to distortions
coming from UI. A higher duration implies that unemployed workers are exposed to skill
decay, that is implied by technical progress, for a longer period of time. The longer
workers stay unmatched the further they drift away from the state-of-the-art, meaning
that fewer of their original production knowledge can, potentially, be transfered to the
next job/technology. This is reﬂected in Column 4 which conﬁrms that the diﬀerence
in the average degree of skill obsolescence across UI regimes is higher in Panel II. The
degree of skill obsolescence in the pool of unemployed determines ﬁrms expected costs of
34Note that the case φ = 0 is basically equivalent to a LS economy, however it diﬀers from that in the
previous section in terms of the replacement rate, ρ. In this section we keep the original parametrization
of φ for the welfare state, i.e. ρ = 0.0137 and just lower φ.
33job creation, see column 5, and therefore governs vacancy posting. For the cases depicted
in Panel II workers stay unemployed for a relatively longer period of time implying that
they loose a higher proportion of their skills. More importantly, in this case the diﬀerence
in the duration - and hence zu - across UI regimes gets more pronounced as the UI
becomes more generous. As a result, the increase in expected job creation costs for
φ = 0.45 (φ = 0.25) is higher by 15.14 (11.54) percentage points than in the case where
no UI is provided and consequently the increase in unemployment is stronger. However,
this should not conceal that the overall importance of UI for explaining the post-75
increase in unemployment is rather limited. This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast to the
results of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007). In their analysis the existence of UI is the
main driving force that generates high levels of unemployment in times of high economic
turbulence. Notice that Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007) refer to turbulence as the
instantaneous loss of a worker’s human capital in the event of a job loss. If we rather
interpret turbulence as the obsolescence of workers human capital during the whole spell
of unemployment then we ﬁnd the feature of increased turbulence also in our setup. The
diﬀerence is, however, that in this paper the increased degree of turbulence stems directly
from an observable change in the economic environment, i.e. the increased rate of arrival
of new technologies. This is clearly a reﬁnement of the rationale Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998, 2007) provide for increased turbulence because (a) it adds microstructure to the
mechanism to the process of skill depreciation and (b) it directly relates increased human
capital obsolescence to the observable acceleration in capital-embodied technical change.




0 1.45 17.46 12.99 20.35 -
0.25 1.74 20.35 13.18 20.39 0.47




0 4.91 38.07 18.39 56.82 -
0.25 6.61 48.99 19.73 57.51 11.54
0.45 7.28 55.72 20.04 59.02 15.14
∆u - change in unemployment rate, %p - change in percentage points, z∗
WS − z∗
LS - indicates
the technology gap relative to the LS case, φ = Replacement rate, Duration of unemployment
is in weeks, ∆JCC - change in JCC relative to case with φ = 0, JCC = expected costs of job
creation, zu = average degree of unemployed skill obsolescence
Table 9: The Eﬀect of Unemployment Insurance
Evidently, there is not much gain from making the UI system more stringent. Reduc-
ing the replacement rate to 25% would lower total unemploment by a mere 0.65 − 1.31
percentage points depending on the initial technology gap. More importantly, one should
not overlook the dramatic increase in unemployment in an economy that provides just
34minor unemployment insurance but suﬀers from large technology gaps. Suppose φ = 0.25
and updating occurs, on average, every 7.5 years. This would generate an unemployment
rate of around 9.25% which exempliﬁes once again that very slack technology adoption
can have serious consequences for the labor market even in economies that do not provide
generous beneﬁts.
The eﬀects of capital-embodied technical change on the equilibrium
The key factor that distinguishes the pre- and the post-75 period and drives the results in
our model is the accelerated rate of arrival of new technologies. In the previous experiment
we set g = 4%, but in order to get a more complete picture we consider also growth rates
of 3.5% and 4.5%. Arguably, a higher g - that creates more severe compatibility problems
and consequently causes higher adoption costs - further delays the process of adoption,
but the relative distance between the laissez-faire and the welfare state economy remains
virtually unchanged. This is not surprising given the way we calibrated the post-75 value
of the cost parameter µ35. The eﬀects of a high g on the average duration and the rate of
unemployed are dramatic. This is best reﬂected by Figure 4 that plots post-75 unemploy-
ment rates for g = 3.5% and 4.5% respectively. An important observation we can make
is that economies in which ﬁrms update rather frequently are least aﬀected by high rates
of arrival of new technologies. The diﬀerence in unemployment rates for g = 3.5% and
g = 4.5% are comparatively small. However, this gap widens quickly as we move to the
right that is as we lower the frequency of updating. The underlying intuition behind this
pattern is as follows. A rise in g that is accompanied by an increase in adoption costs
triggers two eﬀects that are reinforcing each other. Higher costs slow down the process of
updating, consequently workers will be operating a certain technology for a longer time.
This implies that when becoming unemployed their individual distance to the frontier
will, on average, be bigger than it would be under a lower g. As a consequence, the
training costs that are required to update a workers skills in case of a re-match will be
higher, which in turn discourages ﬁrms of opening up new vacancies and hence it increases
unemployment. Moreover, a high g means that the individual technology gap for already
unemployed workers is widening at a faster rate which again causes higher training costs
and therefore discourages job creation.
Do skills matter? The eﬀects on wages and unemployment
The purpose of this section is to analyze to what extend the accumulation of job/technology
speciﬁc skills aﬀects the outcomes presented in the previous sections. To this end we ﬁrst
35Recall that the post-75 value of µ is chosen so that relative increase in updating costs is the same for
the WS and the LS economy.
35Figure 4: Unemployment for g = 3.5% and 4.5%
try to get a better understanding of how speciﬁc skills interact with ﬁrm’s technology
choice and potentially aﬀect the model’s steady state. Sluggish technology updating im-
plies that workers operate a certain technology for a relatively long period of time, hence
they accumulate a substantial amount of speciﬁc skills. In the benchmark case presented
in Section 6 the average skill level is up to 21% higher in an economy that updates less
frequently. The amount of accumulated skills determines an individual’s wage and also
her unemployment beneﬁts. Thus a high degree of specialization implies that displaced
workers with high tenure have a valuable outside option which strengthens their bargain-
ing power when getting re-matched. To compensate ﬁrms for the implied loss in surplus
they would experience ceteris paribus, labor market tightness θ has to adjust in a way
so that ﬁrms can fully recover the expected cost of creating new jobs. As a result, the
vacancy ﬁnding rate declines which raises the average duration of unemployment.
However, there is another eﬀect that suggests a negative relative-wage/tenure relation and
therefore potentially counteracts the ﬁrst eﬀect. When ﬁrms update rather frequently,
they operate technologies that are more productive. Higher productivity translates into
higher wages and therefore fast-updating/high-productivity ﬁrms are expected to pay
higher wages36. Which of these two eﬀects dominates is a quantitative question and will
36Put diﬀerently, wages in fast-updating economies are high because workers operate technologies that
are, on average, very productive, whereas wages in slow-updating economies are high because workers
have accumulated a lot of skills that make them more productive.
36depend on the speed and the scope of technology learning. If workers accumulate speciﬁc
skills rather rapidly then the productivity enhancing eﬀect might initially oﬀset the neg-
ative eﬀect that is induced by shifts in the technology frontier. However, the scope for
technology learning is bounded. Consequently, after a certain amount of time the neg-
ative eﬀect stemming from a widening technology gap will dominate implying that the
within-ﬁrm wage will grow slower than the wage payed at the frontier. Under the baseline
calibration, the eﬀects of technology learning on the accumulation of skills, wages and the
unemployment rate are rather modest. This is implied by the fact that (1) the scope for
technology learning is rather limited and (2) the speed of learning is relatively slow. On
average, agents tap the full potential of a technology only after 10 years, which, given (1)
a separation rate of ρ = 0.0137 and (2) technology updates that occur, on average, every
4.75 − 8.25 years will happen very rarely. Moreover, the progress ratio, that is the ratio
of initial to peak productivity is 1.2. This means that advances in productivity induced
by technology learning amount to 20% at most. This value lies in the range 1.14 − 2.9
of possible progress ratios reported by Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) but to get a more
complete picture and to better assess the eﬀects of learning on wages and unemployment
we consider alternative learning scenarios in this section. In the baseline model we ﬁnd
that net wages in the economy with frequent technology updates are, on average, 11.8%
higher than wages in the economy with low technology turnover37. This is not surprising
given the light eﬀect of skills on wages. The relatively higher wage stems from the fact
that workers in an economy with frequent updating operate technologies that are closer
to the frontier and are, therefore more productive. In order to isolate the net eﬀect of
skills on wages (henceforth called ”skill eﬀect”) we ﬁrst compute the wages that would
be payed in an economy in which no learning occurs. In this way we are able to identify
the relative diﬀerence in wages that is solely due to the diﬀerent vintages that are in
place (this eﬀect we call the ”vintage eﬀect”). We ﬁnd that the vintage eﬀect accounts for
15.46% of the wage diﬀerential between in/frequent updating economies. We next reintro-
duce technology learning according to the baseline calibration and we ﬁnd that the wage
diﬀerential shrinks to 11.8%. In an economy that updates rather infrequently technologies
are kept longer in operation. Hence workers accumulate more skills which translates into
higher wages. Given only the skill eﬀect, wages in late-updating economies would be, on
average, 3.57% higher than the average wage in fast-updating economies. This is rather
modest. Increasing the speed of learning does not change much. If we increase the speed
with which skills are accumulated so that the full potential is reached, on average, after
5 (2.5) years the skill eﬀect amounts to a wage diﬀerential of 4.41% (4.7%). However,
37Notice that we refer to an economy that provides unemployment insurance according to the baseline
calibration.
37the picture changes substantially when we consider higher values of the progress ratio,
i.e. when we increase the scope of learning. When we set the progress ratio to 1.5 and
consider 10, 5 and 2.5 years of learning we get that the skill eﬀect amounts to 8.33%,
10.65% and 11.4% respectively. More and faster learning therefore leads to higher wages.
In an economy that provides unemployment insurance one would expect higher wages
causing higher unemployment. This is not the case in our model, though. Comparing
two otherwise identical economies that diﬀer just with respect to the speed or the scope
of technology learning we see that unemployment will always be lower in the fast-learning
economy. This is intuitive. Technology learning implies that workers can raise a plant’s
level of productivity at no cost. Consequently, ﬁrms exhibit a higher average productivity
in economies that feature learning. This implies further that the value of a job for a ﬁrm
will be higher which is expected to stimulate job creation. This feature is also generated
in our model. In the baseline scenario average workers productivity exceeds that of an
otherwise identical economy that features no technology learning by 14.3%, as a result
job creation is higher by 19.18% and the unemployment rate is lower by 1.73 percentage
points38. If we increase the speed or the scope of learning these eﬀects clearly become
more pronounced. The conclusion we can draw is the following. The more workers can
learn about a certain technology, i.e. the more they can raise its productivity above its
initial level, the higher will be the value of a job for a ﬁrm and hence, the more proﬁtable
it will be creating new jobs.
8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to provide a proper understanding of the linkages between an
economy’s technology adoption behavior, labor market institutions and the dynamics of
unemployment. To this end, a labor market matching model was constructed that has
been augmented by an endogenous technology choice by ﬁrms and a skill accumulation
technology for workers. The outcomes of this model suggest that the frequency of tech-
nology updates in an economy is a key determinant of the performance of the local labor
market. Moreover, the divergence of unemployment rates between major European coun-
tries and the U.S. can be understood taking account for the diﬀerent speed of technology
adoption across both countries. The analysis suggests that the acceleration in capital-
embodied technical change in the mid-1970s is the main driving force of the divergence
of unemployment rates across countries. Furthermore, the results of the paper reject the
38These numbers result from the scenario with sluggish updating. In an economy that updated at
the frequency of the benchmark LS economy the corresponding ﬁgures would be as follows: the average
productivity and job creation would be, respectively, by 13.45% and 7.19% higher, and unemployment
would be lower by 0.35 percentage points.
38popular but highly controversial hypotheses that generous unemployment beneﬁts are
the main reason for high unemployment in Europe. The analysis reveals that even in
welfare-state economies that provide generous beneﬁts, low rates of unemployment can
be achieved by keeping the frequency of technology updates suﬃciently high. This re-
sults suggests that after a shock to embodied technical change economies that are lagging
behind in the adoption and implementation of new technologies experience a signiﬁcant
deterioration in their labor market performance irrespective of the generosity of the ben-
eﬁt system. There is an evident policy implication coming out of this conclusion. Rather
than thinking about cutting back unemployment beneﬁts - which might create large losses
in welfare - policymakers should rather create conditions that prevent the emergence of a
technology deﬁcit. The evidence presented in Section 2 hinted strongly toward a negative
correlation between the strictness of product market regulations and investment in new
technologies. Therefore, the removal or the relaxation of burdensome regulatory practices
appears to be a natural measure to stimulate rapid diﬀusion of new technologies by low-
ering adoption costs. Equally important would be subsidizing the training of unemployed
people, for instance, by providing state-ﬁnanced unemployment training. This measure
would certainly prevent the obsolescence of unemployed workers production knowledge.
Hence it would facilitates their re-integration into the labor market since it makes it less
costly for ﬁrms to hire (and train) workers39.
39If, however, state-ﬁnanced training is a substitute for the training provided by ﬁrms it could poten-
tially create moral hazard on the ﬁrm’s side.
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